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Abstract 
This paper will examine the ways in which peace settlements are producing a lex 
pacificatoria, a new 'law of the peacemakers', in a range of different areas relating to 
international conflict and security law.  The essay illustrates how the practice of fashioning 
and implementing peace settlements is forcing a revision of relevant international law, as the 
traditional assumptions and boundaries of the relevant bodies of law do not fit within post-
settlement political landscapes, are inadequate for enabling and regulating peace settlement 
implementation and do not contain guidance for the dilemmas faced post-settlement. The 
paper describes the ways in which a lack of fit between peace settlement dilemmas and 
international legal doctrines have generated new practices and new articulations of how 
international legal regimes regulate settlement implementation. Building on earlier 
arguments, I argue that these revisions constitute a new lex pacificatoria, or 'law of the 
peacemakers', in the form of a normativized practice of conflict resolution. The extent to 
which these new practices constitute 'law' at all is critically evaluated throughout the chapter. 
In conclusion, I consider whether it is possible, useful and desirable to frame and develop the 
'new law' as a new jus post bellum drawing across existing regimes, to supplement the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello.  
 
Keywords 
Peace settlement; lex pacificatoria; international conflict; security law; international law; jus 
ad bellu; jus in bello. 
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14. Peace settlements and international law: from lex   
    pacificatoria to jus post bellum 
    Christine Bell

 
 
 
1    Introduction 
This chapter will examine the ways in which peace settlements are producing a lex 
pacificatoria, a new ‘law of the peacemakers’, in a range of different areas relating to 
international conflict and security law.
1
 The essay illustrates how the practice of fashioning 
and implementing peace settlements is forcing a revision of relevant international law, as the 
traditional assumptions and boundaries of the relevant bodies of law do not fit within post-
settlement political landscapes, are inadequate for enabling and regulating peace settlement 
implementation and do not contain guidance for the dilemmas faced post-settlement.  
 
The chapter sets out the relationship between peace agreements and international law, 
describing the ways in which a lack of fit between peace settlement dilemmas and 
international legal doctrines have generated new practices and new articulations of how 
international legal regimes regulate settlement implementation. Building on earlier 
arguments, I argue that these revisions constitute a new lex pacificatoria, or ‘law of the 
peacemakers’, in the form of a normativized practice of conflict resolution. The extent to 
which these new practices constitute ‘law’ at all is critically evaluated throughout the chapter. 
In conclusion, I consider whether it is possible, useful and desirable to frame and develop the 
‘new law’ as a new jus post bellum drawing across existing regimes, to supplement the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello.  
 
2   Peace settlements and international law 
The contemporary peace settlement is a post-Cold War phenomenon. International law 
historically divided conflict into ‘international’ conflict, to which international law applied, 
and ‘internal’ conflict, to which it largely did not. This classification, never entirely 
satisfactory, faced a particular challenge post-Cold War where it appeared to reflect neither 
                                                 

 I would like to thank Kasey L. McCall-Smith for research assistance. 
1
 This piece builds and develops arguments set out in C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the 
Lex Pacificatoria, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and C. Bell, ‘Post-conflict Accountability and the 
Reshaping of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, in O. Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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the factual situation of war, which itself appeared ever more fused in its international and 
internal dimensions, nor to delimit appropriate boundaries governing the engagement of 
international law and international organizations.  
 
As the Cold War ended, an apparent post-Cold War rise in intrastate conflict appeared to 
constitute the main threat to international peace and so drew both the attention and 
involvement of international actors acting within a framework of international law. Intrastate 
conflict, originating mainly within state borders, involving state forces and non-state armed 
opposition groups, for example, in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Liberia, increasingly 
had interstate repercussions. It spilt across borders, drew in regional actors as conflict-
underwriters or mediators, and attracted the attention and intervention of international 
organizations, in particular the United Nations (UN), and relevant regional organizations.
2
 In 
addition, new practices of terminating intrastate conflict through negotiated settlement came 
to constitute a key international response to conflict. The new post-Cold War conflicts 
prompted the use of negotiation in an attempt to contain and divert conflict. Long-standing 
conflicts appeared to hold real possibilities for conflict resolution and to present needs and 
opportunities for international intervention – itself now free from Cold War strictures and 
able to experiment. From 1990 onwards, peace processes appeared to break out all over in 
contexts as diverse as South Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and Eastern, and even 
Western, Europe. Even in the most domestic of conflicts, international actors – states, 
coalitions of states and international organizations – became involved in conflict resolution 
efforts. Moreover, conflict resolution within state boundaries was also curiously generated by 
interstate conflict. Post-Cold War, ‘international’ armed conflict began to see international 
military intervention justified partly in terms of post-conflict outcomes for the state against 
which force was deployed. International conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq (2003) 
and Libya were all articulated wholly, or in part, in terms of ambitions to change the 
government and constitutional order of the states in question.
3
 These international 
interventions contemplated some type of post-conflict political and legal reconstruction, often 
to involve the accommodation of those sub-state groups involved in an internal conflict 
operating in parallel to the international conflict.  
                                                 
2
 D. Wippman (ed), International Law and Ethnic Conflict, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).  
3
 There have also been some ‘pure’ interstate conflicts involving two states and often revolving around border 
disputes, for example: Chad/Libya, Ethiopia/Eritrea, China/India, India/Pakistan, and Ecuador/Peru . However, 
even many of these conflicts also had closely related intrastate dimensions. The first war with Iraq of 1991 
forms a clearer exception as an interstate conflict with little (initial) relationship to events within the state. 
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It is difficult to overestimate the scale of this landscape on conflicts from 1990 onwards. In 
the period between 1990 and 2010, over 600 peace agreements were signed in around 90 
jurisdictions.
4
 The types of conflict in which negotiated settlements were attempted were 
varied in terms of their scale, nature, geographical location, the degree of internationalization 
of conflict containment and conflict resolution efforts, and the constellation of international 
actors involved. However, settlement terms indicated a common approach to conflict 
resolution, namely an attempt to negotiate a permanent ceasefire coupled with political and 
legal reforms, aimed at restructuring the state to accommodate the state’s dissenters in a 
revised state formation. Peace settlements also almost invariably contemplated some type of 
international involvement to secure implementation – from full-on international 
administration, such as in Bosnia or Kosovo, to ad hoc involvement of ‘international figures’ 
for one-off implementation tasks, such as the involvement of individuals in decommissioning 
in Northern Ireland.  
 
3    International conflict and security law  
This conflict and peace settlement landscape had an impact on international law even as 
international law attempted to regulate it. The assumptions of relevant international legal 
regimes – human rights law, humanitarian law, refugee law, and even UN Charter law on the 
use of force – were often inapposite to peace process needs and dilemmas. The post-
settlement environment defied distinctions between international/domestic spheres of action, 
between war and peace, and indeed between public (state) and private (non-state) actors, on 
which the boundaries of these legal regimes depended.  
 
(i)    ‘International-domestic’ hybridity    Ending conflict required an internal political 
settlement that was inclusive of military opponents within the state and the external 
enforcement of that settlement.
5
 The internal and external dimensions were linked: internal 
settlement and compromise on the nature of the state was necessary to stopping the fighting, 
while external actors were needed to reassure the state’s opponents that the state would be 
held to its side of the bargain in a domestic political and legal order that was now every bit as 
‘anarchic’ as the international legal system itself. Thus, the typical post-conflict political and 
legal landscape was therefore characterized by ‘international-domestic’ hybridity with post-
                                                 
4
 See Bell, On the Law of Peace, supra n.1, appendix. 
5
 Ibid., Chapters 5 and 10. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/16 
Page 4 of 57 
 
settlement implementation tasks undertaken by international and domestic actors together. 
Post-conflict, states became entities that were both a national jurisdiction, with technical 
continuity of statehood, and at the same time a space of transnational administration 
permeated by international actors and characterized by ‘post-sovereign’ elements, such as bi-
nationalism and international administration. This international-domestic hybridity created 
difficulties for traditional understandings of sovereignty and accountability, as assuming an 
ability to categorize the connection between the governors and the population they govern. 
  
(ii)    War-peace hybridity    Post-conflict seldom is post-conflict – even when a conflict has 
been terminated through a formally agreed ceasefire. War-peace hybridity can be seen in the 
‘no-war-no-peace’ situation that tends to prevail post-settlement. The move from war to not-
war is seldom linear and forms of violence often mutate in complex ways, rather than being 
eliminated. In practice, the signing of a peace agreement was seldom the end of the matter. 
Parties to settlements often reneged on their commitments and, covertly or overtly, returned 
to violence. Parties outside the negotiations post-settlement acted as ‘spoilers’ and attempted 
to destabilize fragile accords through high profile dramatic acts, such as the assassination of 
Rabin post-Oslo accords in the Middle East (now clearly not ‘post-conflict’), the Omagh 
Bomb by the ‘real IRA’ immediately after the Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland, the 
post-Arusha Accord genocide in Rwanda, and on-going violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
On-going conflict violence typically continued and, in some situations, even increased.  Or 
the conflict ostensibly ended to be replaced by the new, more amorphous violence of 
dissenters, ‘organized criminals’, or increased inter-personal violence; for example, the ‘new’ 
racist violence of South Africa, the ‘new’ organized criminality of erstwhile paramilitaries in 
Colombia, or domestic violence. These ‘new’ forms of violence were at once different and 
yet linked to the past conflict in ways that were difficult to document and articulate, let alone 
legally categorize, again with implications as to the governing body of law 
 
In short, post-settlement environments were characterized by a complex mix of war-acts, 
human rights violations, and ‘ordinary’ criminal law violations, perpetrated by a range of 
domestic and international, state and non-state actors. Clear categorization of either the type 
of violence or the status of the perpetrator became impossible. Traditional regime boundaries, 
determining which legal regime applied, to whom and when, simply did not seem to fit the 
facts. Similarly, shifting in and out of different legal regimes, as violence waxed and waned, 
did not service the need for a coherent peace settlement implementation capable of being 
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sustained, even in the face of violent attempts to destabilize it. Rather, what implementation 
required of law was the steady guidance and regulation of a set of complex implementation 
tasks to be undertaken in a fluid and complex security situation.  
 
(iii)    State and non-state actors    Finally, post-conflict environments contained a complex 
mix of state and non-state actors, both of whom could be alleged to be acting in private 
interest whilst laying legitimate claim to be public actors. Indeed, the very distinction 
between public and private, state and non-state actors is complicated by the fact of political 
transition. Both state and non-state actors face charges from each other that they do not 
represent ‘the public’ whilst claiming such representation for themselves. During transition 
from conflict to peace, the nature of the state itself is in transition from an authoritarian, 
illegitimate, violent or exclusionary regime, not acting in the traditional ‘public’ role of the 
state, towards a less authoritarian, more legitimate, less violent and exclusionary future, 
where public actors are restrained by public law.
6
 Non-state actors may also be transiting 
from ‘private’ actors and claiming a representative legitimacy, as politicians or army chiefs, 
for example. The post-conflict period is one of attempted transition to a new political and 
even constitutional framework aimed at creating a new ‘public’ in which both the ‘old’ state 
and the new non-state actors will participate, eventually under the legitimacy of a revised 
form of election. However, the period of transition is one in which the legitimacy of both 
state and non-state actors is constantly under question and where civil society actors and 
international actors (also operating without electoral mandates) are often given a role to 
supplement and supervise the role of state and non-state actors as authors and implementers 
of any new order. In legal terms, this set of transitional political realities creates difficulties 
for deciding who constitutes ‘the state’ in the event that the new transitional arrangements for 
holding power start to fall apart. Given that international law distinguishes between public 
and private actors and draws its use of force boundaries, with specific reference to concepts 
such as ‘state consent’, again a set of ‘fit’ dilemmas arises: if peacekeepers need to move 
from peaceful settlement of disputes to enforcement – whose consent is necessary? What do 
the traditional concepts of neutrality and impartiality between conflict parties mean in a 
context in which the fabric and legitimacy of the state is being re-constituted to include both 
former state officials and anti-state combatants as part of the new constitutional order? If part 
of the post-conflict business is accountability for past human rights abuses and violations, but 
                                                 
6
 See generally, C. Bell, ‘Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status’, (2006) 100 AJIL 373. 
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any attempt to move from these patterns of abuses and violations depends on the on-going 
consent of both state and non-state actors to a new set of political and legal institutions, then 
who should hold who accountable for what and under what legal regime?  
 
4    A new lex pacificatoria  
Over the last twenty years of peace settlement practice, the needs and dilemmas of that 
practice began to force an interpretive revision of international law. Elsewhere I have argued 
that these developments can best be understood as a new ‘lex pacificatoria’ or ‘law of the 
peacemakers’.  This lex  bears similarity to the concept of lex mercatoria in that it stands less 
as a fully-fledged new legal regime and more as a set of practices moving in a normativized 
direction, that is: they are increasingly codified by soft law standards (as the ‘industry 
standards’ of peacemakers rather than merchants); shape, and are incorporated in, 
interpretations of binding legal instruments; on occasion influence, or are determinative of, 
court judgments. However, it is suggested that the normative impact of the new lex lies less 
in these normative impacts and more in the ways in which the practices are articulated to be 
compliant with, and even creative extensions of, traditional legal doctrines.  The lex creates 
an on-going normative expectation as to how the political and moral conundrums of post-
conflict reconstruction should be handled, thus giving it a jurisgenerative quality. A full 
account of these dynamics is beyond the scope of this chapter, however, the broad rubric and 
dynamic of the emergent ‘new lex’ can be sketched in outline.  
 
5    A new law of hybrid self-determination  
 
A    Traditional understandings 
Self-determination law provides that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.’7 A range of legal declarations (and indeed the 
UN Charter) make clear that states retain a right to territorial integrity.
8
  Prior to 1990 it was a 
truism to state that the law on self-determination was unclear.  Emerging in the de-
colonization period as a legal norm, whether and how the norm applies post-decolonization 
                                                 
7
 Article 1, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
8
 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), GA Res. 2625(XXV) (1970); Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), GA Res. 1514(XV) (1960); Article 2(4), 
Charter of the United Nations (1945).  
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has been much debated.Outside the de-colonization context the norm’s two pillars, respect 
for territorial integrity and a commitment to representative government for peoples, appear to 
clash. Rather than resolving self-determination disputes, the norm stood accused of fuelling 
them by telling states and their secessionist opponents that they both had a right to the quite 
different territorial and political states they aspire to.
9
  
 
B    The lex pacificatoria  
This relationship between peace processes, peace settlements and self-determination law 
produced a new concept of ‘hybrid self-determination’, which operated to transcend the 
apparent tension of the dual commitment to territorial integrity and representative 
government by incorporating dimensions of both external and internal self-determination into 
the framework for resolving conflict. Conflict resolution practices centred on negotiations 
that included state and non-state actors on an equal basis and brokered compromise 
agreements that split power through a range of innovative power-sharing mechanisms, but 
also split sovereignty – not territorially, but by internationalizing the new constitutional 
arrangements in innovative ways . Even the commitment to elections – a legal requirement 
under international human rights law – is, at the same time, a practical political necessity for 
auto-implementation of the new order.  
 
The hybrid self-determination solutions of peace settlement, in general terms, therefore had 
some, or all, of the following elements: 
 
 a procedural right for peoples to be heard, as implemented through negotiations 
between the state and groups who can credibly claim to be excluded from the state’s 
social contract 
 a substantive right to elections, to an individual rights framework and to additional 
constitutional arrangements aimed at effective participation of groups in public 
decision-making, through mechanisms such as power-sharing and/or territorial 
autonomy 
                                                 
9
 See discussion in M. Weller, ‘Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent Developments’, (2009) 20 EJIL 
111, initial pages dealing with three instances where the law was unclear; see generally, J. Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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 a right to dislocated statehood, or ‘fuzzy sovereignty’, which dislocates the state’s 
power from a territorially defined ‘demos’, through forms of bi-nationalism, the 
language of external self-determination and/or international supervision 
 
From one point of view, these elements are produced as a logical consequence of the 
commitment to negotiated solutions to conflict. The logical response to negotiating disputes 
over access to the symbolism, power and resources of the state is to find ways to ‘split’ them 
and give all contenders access. The attempt to ‘dislocate’ power, from a territorially defined 
‘demos’ to a more fluid ‘beyond-the-state’ set of institutions and actors, further splits power.  
 
However, this new ‘hybrid self-determination’ did not present itself as a crude compromise, 
but also as a reconciliation of the conflicting legal claims that the parties had made as to the 
application of self-determination law. By incorporating elements of internal self-
determination through changes in the nature of the state, to make it more representative of all 
its peoples, and also of external self-determination through a more fluid notion of the external 
territoriality of the state, hybrid self-determination could claim to be an innovative fulfilment 
of self-determination law, capable of transcending, and thereby reconciling, not just 
competing self-determination claims.  
 
In addition to this claim to normativity rather than mere conflict resolution technique, a range 
of soft law standards and court decisions began to both reflect and underwrite the 
development of the practice, adding to the norm’s normative dimensions. These standards 
underwrite not just a ‘right to be heard’ but the second element of hybrid self-determination, 
namely, a right to some substantive revision of state political and legal institutions to ensure 
an on-going ‘right to be heard’ that goes beyond a right to elections (legally guaranteed in 
human rights law), to ensure not just participation as representation but ‘effective 
participation’. The UN Declaration on the Rights of National Minorities, the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the Council of Europe Framework Convention on 
Minority Rights developed the idea of ‘effective participation’ as a substantive legal 
requirement of domestic constitutional and legal processes.
10
 In addition to these minority 
                                                 
10
 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities 
(1992), GA Res 47/135, annex, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993) (hereinafter referred to as UN Declaration on 
Minorities), Articles 2(3) and 5 (effective participation); Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), 
GA Res. 61/295, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007) (hereinafter referred to as UN Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples), Articles 18-20 (effective participation) and 38 (consultation with indigenous peoples to achieve goals 
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and indigenous peoples’ standards,a number of legal standards and international guidelines 
now also address the need for inclusion of other groups: participation of women (addressed 
further in 3 below), children, and even groups, such as ‘victims’ or ‘displaced persons’, in 
political negotiations and legal processes that will affect them.
11
 The endorsement of a ‘right 
to be heard’ can also be seen in decisions of international organizations and international 
courts and tribunals, which have emphasised a right to processes of resolution in self-
determination cases, rather than deciding in favour of the status quo of the existing state, or 
secession in cases involving self-determination claims.
12
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
of declaration); Council of Europe, Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (1994) 
(hereinafter referred to as Framework Convention), that draws on the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in European (later OSCE) documents that preceded it; see for example, Report of the CSCE Committee of 
Experts on National Minorities (19 July 1991), (1991) 30 ILM 1692. The Convention Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169) (1989), adopted on 27 June 1989 by the General 
Conference of the International Labour Organization, similarly emphasises recognition and the need to move 
beyond representative democracy to ensure participation: article 2(1) provides that: ‘Governments shall have the 
responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned, co-ordinated and systematic 
action to protect the rights of these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.’ 
Article 6(1)(b) provides that Governments are to: ‘Establish means by which these peoples can freely 
participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in 
elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern 
them .’ 
11
 Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Annex II, Beijing Platform for Action (1995), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.177/20 (1995) (hereinafter referred to as Beijing Platform for Action), at paras 181-195 (Women in 
power and decision-making); Article 68 (participation of victims), Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1998) (hereinafter referred to as Rome Statute). New standards on impunity also provide for the 
participation of women, minorities, and victims in the design of transitional justice mechanisms, and associated 
rule of law reform, see D. Orentlicher, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to 
Combat Impunity, Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 
(2005) (hereinafter referred to as Updated Set of Principles), at paras 7(c) and 35 . See also UN Secretary-
General, Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2004), UN 
Doc. S/2004/616 (2004), at para. 64(f), providing that participation of ‘groups most affected by conflict and a 
breakdown of the rule of law, among them children, women, minorities, prisoners and displaced persons’ . New 
standards on a right to return of refugees and displaced persons similarly note their right to ‘participate in the 
return and restitution process and in the development of the procedures and mechanisms put in place to protect 
these rights’; see for example, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The Right 
to Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (2002), UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2002/30 (2002), 
at para. 6. 
12
 See, ICJ decisions cited in J. Klabbers, ‘The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-determination in International 
Law’, (2006) 28 HRQ 286; see also, Opinions Nos. 1-10 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia, published in (1992) 31 ILM 1494 (No. 1), 1497 (No. 2), 1499 (No. 3), 1501 (No. 4), 
1503 (No. 5), 1507 (No. 6), 1512 (No. 7), 1521 (No. 8), 1523 (No. 9), 1525 (No. 10); Opinions 11-15 published 
in (1993) 32 ILM 1586 (No. 11), 1589 (No. 12), 1591 (No. 13), 1593 (No. 14), 1595 (No. 15) (collectively 
referred to as the Badinter Opinions); European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines 
on the Recognition of New States (16 December 1991), (1992) 31 ILM 1485 . See, R. Rich, ‘Recognition of 
States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, (1993) 4 EJIL 36; M. Weller, ‘The International 
Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, (1992) 86 AJIL 569, for 
discussion of the complex relationship between the Yugoslav Guidelines, the conflict in Yugoslavia and the 
Badinter Opinions issued with respect to it .  
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As regards the second innovative dimension of hybrid self-determination, ‘fuzzy 
sovereignty’, again this concept is promoted by international legal standards that contemplate 
that self-government can go ‘beyond-the-state’.13 As regards bi-nationalism, and group 
contacts and governance that goes beyond the state’s territory, the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention on National Minorities and the UN Declaration on National 
Minorities refer to the right of ethnic groups to maintain cross-border contacts with ethnic 
counterparts in other jurisdictions and for states even to sign bilateral agreements to this 
effect.
14
 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples expressly provides that 
indigenous peoples divided by international borders ‘have the right to maintain and develop 
contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, 
economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across 
borders’ and that states should take effective measures to ‘facilitate the exercise and ensure 
the implementation of this right’.15 These provisions parallel and underwrite self-
determination settlement attempts to severe notions of ‘nationhood’ from territorially-based 
notions of ‘statehood’. 
  
The second mechanism for dislocating power – international supervision – also has a tenuous 
legal basis. First and foremost, international administration and supervision can be authorized 
by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in particular conflicts. More recently, however, there 
have been attempts to found a more general legal articulation of ‘fuzzy’ or ‘contingent’ 
sovereignty through the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine.16 Attempts to rationalize and 
bound ‘humanitarian interventions’, (that is military intervention justified as a response to 
violations of humanitarian law), have attempted a fundamental revision of state sovereignty 
at the international constitutional level by developing a concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. 
The ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine works by attempting to reframe military intervention 
away from a ‘humanitarian’ exception to state sovereignty and towards a new 
conceptualization of sovereignty that views sovereignty as contingent on the state’s 
                                                 
13
 See generally, W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 3-55, passim, (arguing that these are a key part of the ‘re-
internationalization’ of state-minority relations). 
14
 UN Declaration on Minorities, supra n.10, Articles 2(5), 5(2) and 6; Framework Convention, supra n.10, 
Articles 17 and 18.  
15
 UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, supra n.10, Article 36. 
16
 See, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN Doc. A/60/L.1 (2005), at paras 138-139; International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, available at www.responsibilitytoprotect.org; Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, available at globalr2p.org. 
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willingness and ability to protect its own citizens.
17
 Of course, the attempt to formulate 
sovereignty as conditioned on ‘the responsibility to protect’ can be seen as not very bounded 
and merely a rhetorical flourish that mitigates and justifies foreign intervention almost at will. 
Nonetheless, cynical or not, the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ illustrates an attempt to 
underwrite international intervention by revising the concept of sovereignty, rather than 
articulating intervention as an exception to it: sovereignty must be envisaged as justified by 
states in terms of the prior normative authority of ‘the people’, rather than claimed as a static 
attribute of states as black boxes and therefore confers obligations as well as rights. Once 
sovereignty is reconceived as a ‘relational’, rather than an absolute, concept it becomes more 
‘fuzzy’ – degrees of sovereignty, shared sovereignty and ‘earned’ sovereignty all become 
possible and international organizations are legitimized as supervisors and enablers of 
sovereignty, rather than entities that transgress the legitimate sphere of states.  
 
C   Normative (in)stability  
Despite the emergence of a normativized practice of ‘hybrid self-determination’, its 
normative basis is unstable with regard to its two main innovations. Soft law standards, the 
practices of international organizations, and even international courts and tribunals, have all 
appeared to endorse the concept; however, as Kymlicka has pointed out, these normative 
developments remain ad hoc, unstable, patchy and difficult to roll out beyond a European 
context.
18
 However, courts have sent out mixed messages as regards what provision for the 
‘effective participation’ of groups is required or permitted concomitant with international 
human rights standards focused on the equality of individuals. Kymlicka argues that there is a 
tension between an approach of general anti-discrimination norms and targeted norms that go 
beyond anti-discrimination to suggest substantive measures aimed at including particular 
kinds of minorities, such as national minorities or indigenous peoples. As Iorns Magallanes 
argues, this tension can also be viewed as a tension between ‘democratization’ standards, and 
‘indigenous peoples’ standards, which in practice comes down to a different stance on groups 
rights, and in particular the need to have measures that ensure the effective participation of 
groups in the political process.
19
 In short, while indigenous peoples’ standards and decisions 
involving such group dimensions appear to have moved towards requiring such mechanisms, 
in the realm of minority rights there appears to be a measure of retreat to a concept of 
                                                 
17
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18
 Kymlicka, supra n.13, Chapter 8. 
19
 C. Iorns Magallanes, ‘Indigenous Rights and Democratic rights in International Law: An “Uncomfortable 
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individual equality and a classic ‘liberal’ framework for political participation and rights. As 
regards power-sharing, for example, some soft law standards, guidelines and commentators 
suggest that it constitutes good practice, its hybridity between representative and participative 
democracy constitute a form of ‘responsible realism’, which combines a commitment to 
individual rights with a commitment to the realities of the need for group accommodation for 
equality to be achieved and sustained in practice.
20
 However, other international courts and 
commentators view such mechanisms as being of dubious international legality, at best to be 
tolerated as a temporary transitional device where they can be demonstrated to enable a move 
from conflict to peace, moving to unlawful once the situation has stabilized.
21
  
 
Similarly, the post-state dimensions of hybrid self-determination also have an unstable 
normative basis. The ‘right to protect’ is a new and controversial doctrine and while some 
legal standards promote ‘beyond-the-state’ institutions, it is unclear that these are required of 
states. It is often claimed that ‘self-determination law is not a suicide club for states’, and 
neither is the new lex of ‘hybrid self-determination’. While international law shows some 
programmatic endorsement of extra-national mechanisms for creating beyond-the-state 
governance, and while there are attempts to justify international intervention on the grounds 
that claims of sovereignty must be connected to good government within the state, both 
constitute a radical revision of a system of international law based on the sovereign equality 
of states, about which there is little to no formal consensus.  
 
The instability of the norms underwriting hybrid self-determination appear to invite 
resolution in the direction of retreat to more traditional notions of participation and statehood, 
or in the direction of solidifying and clarifying the boundaries of the new normative approach 
in a way that states could tolerate. Paradoxically, this normative instability is, to some extent, 
sustaining normative developments: neither development of the norm, nor retreat from it 
appear possible or desirable. Curiously, the capacity of hybrid self-determination 
arrangements to operate as a ‘holding device’ for disagreements between the parties to a 
conflict over sovereignty also enables it to operate as a holding device at the international 
                                                 
20
 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), at 19-24. See, Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National 
Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory Note (September 1999), available at www.osce.org/hcnm/30325. 
21
 Case of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Eur. Ct. 
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level, bridging competing conceptions of how sovereignty should be understood in a post-
Westphalian international legal world. It is easier, for example, for states to live with a fluid 
and partial quasi-law of hybrid self-determination into which they can all read a version of 
self-determination law they can ascribe to, than to embrace and support a move to 
international law as requiring, for example, liberal statehood or a defined concept of a 
humanitarian exception.  
 
6    A new law of gender inclusion  
 
A    Traditional understandings  
Traditionally, the process of negotiating an end to a conflict was a matter for the parties to the 
conflict and, to the extent that the conflict was viewed as an ‘internal’, the only thing 
constraining who came to the table, and what was discussed there, was the political will of 
the parties involved. Peacemaking in non-international conflicts was a domestic political 
matter for those involved in the conflict and untouched by international legal frameworks. 
With the development of human rights law, equality for women became a matter of 
international concern. However, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 1979 (CEDAW) notoriously did not address violence 
against women, nor did it address violent conflict in which women were caught. The idea that 
equality for women should make demands on the process or substance of peace settlements 
required over a decade of exploring the gendered dynamics of conflict, a rise in the impact of 
human rights law more generally and experience of the gendered nature of peace 
negotiations. 
 
B    The lex pacificatoria  
The post-Cold War environment was one in which human rights and humanitarian law 
standards were understood to apply to both conflict and peace processes and were 
increasingly understood to constrain both the process and substance of negotiations. 
Moreover, the same post-Cold War years that witnessed a steady proliferation of peace 
processes and peace agreements aimed at bringing violent social conflict to an end
22
 were 
also marked by the transnational mobilization of women to secure feminist-informed reform 
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to international law and institutions.
23
 Violence against women was itself defined as a form of 
discrimination
24
 and increasingly international conferences and resolutions began to 
emphasise the need to consider the gendered dimensions of armed conflict and its impact on 
women and women’s equality.25 With the rise of peace processes and agreements, attention 
focused on the inclusion of women in peace processes, the gender impact of what the parties 
to conflict agreed to and post-conflict accountability for the abuse of women, in particular 
sexual violence.  
 
It can also be argued that concern about the inclusiveness or non-inclusiveness of peace 
processes with regard to women also derived from the concept of hybrid self-determination. 
A concept that endorses a right to participate cannot draw the line at the participation of the 
ethnic protagonists to the conflict.  As touched on in Part 2, processes aimed at linking 
ceasefires to constitutional revision raise questions as to the appropriate authors of such 
revision. In a context where neither state nor non-state actors can assert themselves as fully 
legitimate representatives of ‘the people’, and where issues of ‘equality’ and inclusion are 
central to conflict resolution, it begs the question of how widely the concepts of equality and 
inclusion should go.  
 
Again, it can be argued, both as a conflict resolution imperative and a response to 
international human rights standards relating to women, that a new law of gender inclusion 
began to be articulated and underwritten by new legal standards that specifically addressed 
peace processes. Most notably, marking the culmination of a series of resolutions and World 
Conference commitments, on the 31 October 2000 UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security was passed.
26
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 N. Reilly, Women’s Human Rights: Seeing Gender Justice in a Globalising Age, (Oxford: Polity, 2008); see 
also, A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
Chapter 2 .  
24
 Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 
19 (1992), UN Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/ Add.15 (1992), at para. 1: ‘Gender-based violence is a form of 
discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with 
men.’ 
25
 Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in 
Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (2000), UN Doc. A/55/138-S/2000/693, Annex I and II (2000); 
Bejing Platform for Action, supra n.11; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (1993), at para. 29. 
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Resolution 1325 called for women’s equal participation with men and their full involvement 
in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. It reaffirmed the need 
to fully implement international humanitarian and human rights law to protect women and 
girls from human rights abuses, including gender-based violence.
27
 It identified the need to 
mainstream gender perspectives in relation to conflict prevention, peace negotiations, 
peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction and 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives.
28
 The resolution was addressed 
variously to UN institutions, member states and all parties to armed conflict. Of particular 
note here, the Resolution specifically targeted peace processes and agreements; paragraph 8: 
 
Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace 
agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: 
(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and 
resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; 
(b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous 
processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the 
implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; 
(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of 
women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, 
the police and the judiciary; 
 
The adoption of Resolution 1325 was significant on several grounds. The resolution 
constituted the first time that the UNSC turned its full attention to the subject of women and 
armed conflict and acknowledged the role of women as active agents in the negotiation and 
maintenance of peace agreements, legalizing the issue.
29
 The resolution symbolically marked 
the impact of war on women and provided formal, high-level acknowledgement that the 
exclusion of women from conflict resolution is a threat to peace . In practice, the resolution 
automatically triggered on-going UN attention to women, peace and security, not least 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., at paras 9, 10, 11 and 12.  
28
 Ibid., at paras  1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 13. 
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through creating the need for on-going UN Secretary-General reporting on its 
implementation.
30
 The resolution constituted a major victory for women’s transnational 
mobilization in mainstreaming women’s equality within the UN.31 In the approach to its ten 
year anniversary, Resolution 1325 was supplemented by additional UNSC resolutions aimed 
at strengthening and expanding its provisions and securing its implementation. UNSC 
Resolution 1820 (2008) continues and reinforces Resolution 1325’s provisions on sexual 
violence against women in armed conflict and urges increased participation of women in 
peace talks.
32
  UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009), focusing on the implementation of measures 
dealing with sexual violence, also notes in its preamble ‘the under-representation of women 
in formal peace processes, the lack of mediators and ceasefire monitors with proper training 
in dealing with sexual violence, and the lack of women as Chief or Lead peace mediators in 
United Nations-sponsored peace talks.’33  This was closely followed by UNSC Council 
Resolution 1889 (2009) aimed at increasing awareness and achieving the implementation of 
Resolution 1325 and affirming its key peace process dimensions.
34
  
 
C    Normative (in)stability  
Unlike the normative developments with relation to hybrid self-determination, the norm of 
gender inclusion appears to be fairly clearly articulated and fairly stable. However, it also 
remains sparsely implemented. Between 1990 and 2010, only 16% of peace agreements 
mention women in any form, although these mentions rise from 11% before the passing of 
UNSC Resolution 1325, to 25% after.
35
  Most of these references are isolated and, while 
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perhaps of benefit to some women, do not evidence the adoption of a holistic ‘gender 
perspective’ that UNSC 1325 contemplates. Rather than normative instability, there is an 
‘under enforcement’ issue.36  The under enforcement of UNSC 1325, however, raises a wider 
difficulty with the normativisation of peace processes and peace agreements.  How far should 
normative standards dictate the substance of peace agreement texts and the make-up of peace 
agreement processes, and to what extent do the ideals which they articulate need to be 
balanced with the need to leave enough substance to negotiators, to enable them to reach 
agreements which they are capable and willing of implementing? The development of a norm 
of gender inclusion in peace processes and agreements points to a tension between using 
norms to shape, and even dictate, who and what gets included and the need to create a 
dynamic process, which has capacity to lead to a number of different outcomes and is thus 
capable of bringing fighting parties to the table – the conflict itself often forming a key 
barrier to any material gains for women.  
  
7    A new law of return  
 
A    Traditional understandings  
Traditionally international law did not address the right of refugees and displaced persons to 
return to their home country, less to the actual physical houses that they had been forced out 
of. Rather, refugee law was more concerned with the right of refugees not to return to homes 
where they would be persecuted.
37
 The one conflict in which return was a political demand of 
refugees, the Israel-Palestine conflict, was excepted from the refugee convention regime and 
had its own UN agency.
38
 A number of general human rights provisions, however, appear to 
support a right of refugees and displaced persons to return home at the end of conflict: 
namely, article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966  
(ICCPR) provides that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country.’ Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for a right to 
                                                 
36
 See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for the concept of ‘under-enforcement’ in a gender context, F. Ní Aoláin, ‘Gendered 
Under-enforcement in the Transitional Justice Context’, in S Buckley-Zistel and R. Stanley (eds), Gender in 
Transitional Justice, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); F. Ní Aoláin and E. Rooney, 
‘Underenforcement and Intersectionality: Gendered Aspects of Transition’, (2007) 1 Int’l J of Trans Justice 338. 
37
 Article 33(1), UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) (hereinafter referred to as Refugee 
Convention. 
38
 Refugee Convention, ibid., provides in the introductory note that the Convention:  
[D]oes not apply to those refugees who benefit from the protection or assistance of a United Nations 
agency other than UNHCR, such as refugees from Palestine who fall under the auspices of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/16 
Page 18 of 57 
 
own private property and not to be arbitrarily deprived of that property, which could be used 
to support a right to return to actual homes that were vacated or to be provided with 
compensation, although this right appears in neither the ICCPR nor the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR). The concept of 
‘refugee’ is given a strict legal definition under the Refugee Convention 1951 as, ‘people 
who have fled across an international boundary as a result of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, 
or political opinion.’39 Those who have committed serious crimes are not included. No 
specific legal regime provides for either the right not to return, or the right to return, of ‘non-
status refugees’ – those fleeing across state borders displaced by general armed conflict, or 
‘internally displaced persons’ – those who flee homes and localities but do not cross 
international borders.  
 
B    The lex pacificatoria  
The post-Cold War conflict and post-conflict environment exposed a lack of fit between the 
coverage and concerns of refugee law and the political and material needs of all those 
displaced by the conflict and also third party states affected by flows of people. As regards 
fit, often the refugee law definitions of refugee do not fit those who flee as a result of 
conflict. People do flee merely under well-founded fears of persecution, but also in 
anticipation of attack, meaning it can be unclear whether [or ‘if’ – but not ‘how’] they satisfy 
the Convention definition. In practice, the scale of mass movement triggered by conflict post-
1990 reinvigorated a notion of ‘temporary protection’ used by third party receiving countries 
to avoid processing individual asylum claims, but also to keep post-conflict ‘return’ open 
both legally and politically.
40
 In fact, the Refugee Convention itself does not provide a formal 
right to resettlement in the country of refuge, or a right of resettlement elsewhere, neither 
does it provide for a formal right not to be returned to the state of origin once the situation 
permits. The 1990s saw a concept of ‘safe return’ promoted by reception states as a mid-way 
measure between ‘voluntary return’ (the concept preferred by the UN High Commissioner on 
Refugees) and de facto expulsion, as debates over the temporary nature of protection, the 
extent of necessary protection from refoulement, and the permissibility of mandatory return 
under the Convention gathered pace. For reasons of self-interest, displacement as a result of 
                                                 
39
 Regional conventions definitions are somewhat broader, see OAU, Convention Governing the Specific 
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conflict focused international attention on the return of refugees and displaced persons as a 
post-conflict imperative.  
 
From the perspective of the political and moral basis of the peace process, however, there 
were also reasons to make provision for return. Where displacement had been not just a 
consequence of conflict but a tool of the conflict, for example, the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia, 
‘undoing’ the expulsion of ethnic groups through return constituted a political demand of 
displaced constituencies and their representatives, while fitting with the interests of reception 
states. Negotiating return in such cases, however, is clearly linked to broader questions over 
the allocation of power and territory to competing ethnic groups, at the core of peace 
settlements. Most notably, return of the displaced has capacity to change the balance of 
minorities and majorities in electoral units. Return was often also viewed as part of a concept 
of reparation for victims of the conflict and an attempt to ‘restore’ them to their previous 
situation. Moreover, from a purely pragmatic point of view, aggrieved displaced communities 
could sow the seeds of renewed conflict by creating an on-going perception that the conflict 
is not over by agitating as diaspora against an indigenous leadership, and even by funding 
conflict. An unmanaged return and re-claiming of property, with no peace agreement 
provision for re-distribution or compensation, had a very direct capacity to re-ignite local 
conflicts and the central conflict itself. Dealing with the return of those displaced by the 
conflict became a peace agreement imperative because failing to do so would affect the 
sustainability of the settlement.  
 
Even where displacement was a consequence, rather than a tool, of the conflict it was 
important to deal with issues of return in many peace agreements. People often start to return 
home if a situation is perceived to be safe, such as when a ceasefire or peace agreement is 
signed, even in the absence of a peace agreement commitment to return. A rapid return of a 
large number of people without the involvement of appropriate international and domestic 
agencies can create a host of social problems that a peace agreement can usefully anticipate 
and address. Management of return was understood to be crucial to post-conflict stability and 
the safety of returnees.  
 
Again, provision of peace agreements bolstered by soft law standards began to address these 
gaps, ‘creating’ law and fleshing out more detailed legal provision and new institutional 
mechanisms to facilitate a ‘right to return’. In 1995, for example, the Dayton Peace 
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Agreement made detailed provision for a ‘right to return’ for displaced persons. Annex 7 
provided an Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Article 1 providing that 
 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of 
origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them the property of which they 
were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any 
property that cannot be restored to them.
41
  
 
A set of positive obligations and mechanisms for giving effect to this right were then 
provided for: the UNHCR was called on to ‘develop in close consultation with asylum 
countries and the parties [to the agreement] a repatriation plan’ to allow for ‘early’ return of 
refugees and displaced persons; while the parties undertook to cooperate with, and give 
unrestricted access to, UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN 
Development Programme and other relevant international, domestic and non-governmental 
organizations.
42
 Similar provisions aimed at establishing and enabling a right to return can be 
found in a range of other peace agreements.
43
  
 
These types of mechanisms began also to be reflected in soft law standards, such as UN 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons.
44
 These specifically defined and addressed 
all forms of displaced persons, whether they satisfied Refugee Convention definitions or not, 
and started to flesh out a right to return, to include  
 
A right to return to one’s country and even locality 
A right for return to be voluntary 
A right not to be returned where conditions are not safe 
A right to return to own homes or to be compensated where this is not possible 
                                                 
41
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A right not to be discriminated against, having returned, and to political, legal and physical 
security 
A requirement on parties to the conflict to cooperate with the relevant agencies to ensure safe 
and voluntary return 
A right to be included as a group in decisions about return, including in the peace 
negotiations themselves 
 
These standards claimed to be an elucidation of existing hard law standards, such as human 
rights law or international criminal law.
45
 However, they significantly develop the law as they 
apply it to the post-settlement context, constituting a quasi-specialist regime for displaced 
persons.
46
  
 
C    Normative (in)stability  
As with the area of gender inclusion, there is little internal instability in these new norms, 
although there appear to be no moves to codify them as ‘hard law’. Rather, they too are 
‘under enforced’. Further, as with the issue of gender, when taken cumulatively with other 
norms relating to peace settlement terms, these ‘return’ norms appear to further limit the 
realm of what can be freely negotiated, again indicating a dilemma over whether to adopt a 
maximalist approach that attempts to ensure that return is dealt with, and dealt with in 
appropriate detail, and a pragmatic approach that leaves room to pragmatic concerns of how 
best to get people to agree and to implement their agreement.
47
  
 
8  A new law of transitional justice 
 
A    Traditional understandings of post-conflict accountability  
Traditionally, the ending of interstate conflict included broad amnesties for those waging the 
war aimed at the demobilization of troops and the return of prisoners taken during the war.
48
 
After the First World War, punitive reparations were imposed against Germany, which were 
                                                 
45
 See, W. Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – Annotations, (Washington, DC: ASIL and 
Brookings Institutions, 2000). 
46
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later seen as having played a part in the political dynamics which led to the rise of Hitler. 
After the Second World War, an individual criminal justice approach was preferred, with the 
dedicated and temporal individual criminal law processes in the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
tribunals. In the period between 1945 and 1990, however, a concept of international 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts continued to be developed that viewed state-
to-state reparations as the key remedy.
49
  
 
As regards internal conflict, the question of how to deal with those who had been involved in 
the conflict was assumed to be a political matter, with the granting of domestic amnesty even 
a ‘right’ of states. Up until the early 1990s, the negotiated settlements of such conflicts 
typically viewed amnesty as a key tool in peace negotiations and the idea that there was a 
justice-peace dilemma did not figure. For example, formal or de facto amnesties figured in 
attempts to end the conflict in Northern Ireland and the conflict with the Red Brigades in 
Italy in the 1980s. Concepts of reparations as applying between the state and individuals 
within the state were to depend on developments in human rights law.
50
 
 
B    The lex pacificatoria  
Again, it can be argued that the post-conflict landscape has significantly revised international 
law towards a partial and somewhat messy ‘new law’ of transitional justice. In this case, the 
new lex was a product of ‘fitting’ the accountability requirements of human rights and 
humanitarian law to post-conflict accountability demands, as mediated by the need to sustain 
the ceasefire. This process revised both regimes, whilst also shaping the development of 
international criminal law, moving towards establishing a broad ‘common denominator’. This 
common denominator establishes a normative imperative in the direction of a prohibition of 
broad amnesties that include serious war crimes, while leaving some (loosely identified) 
scope for negotiating partial accountability as not requiring full investigation, prosecution 
and punishment for all violators and violations. Coupled with this provision on 
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accountability, the new lex requires the rights of victims to be addressed and has involved 
viewing reparations as the entitlement of victims and local communities, rather than states.
51
  
 
The normative move towards prohibiting amnesties has been articulated as being required by 
the combined import of human rights and humanitarian law, as underwritten by international 
criminal law developments.
52
 These new interpretations of the legal regimes are again 
underwritten by a range of soft law standards, by judicial decisions, and by peace agreement 
practice.  
 
(i)    Human rights law.  At the end of the Cold War it was not initially apparent that human 
rights had any post-conflict regulatory claim over the conflict just past. It was with respect to 
the resolution of conflicts in Central and South America that the argument first came to be 
made that human rights law had a post-conflict reach. Human rights commentary and 
advocacy from the early 1990s argued that human rights law did impose obligations on the 
post-settlement regime to account for the violations of the past regime.
53
 The argument was 
that human rights standards imposed not just a negative obligation to not violate rights, but, 
in respect of serious human rights violations, such as arbitrary execution and torture, imposed 
positive obligations to investigate and, possibly, to prosecute and even punish those 
responsible, which constrained and outlasted any political settlement and even regime 
change. However, it was suggested that a balance with the political needs of transition were 
met by the fact that not all human rights violations had to be systematically investigated, 
prosecuted and punished, but rather international legal requirements could be met by focusing 
on grave human rights abuses.
54
 Perhaps not surprisingly, these arguments were developed 
first in the context of Central and Southern America, where impunity was a key feature of the 
conflict and a mechanism whereby it tended to be recycled.. From this context the idea of an 
explicitly ‘transitional’ form of justice was required as a form of justice that took place in, 
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and responded to, a political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The concept of 
‘transition to democracy’ was understood to shape the type of accountability offered. Pursuit 
of democratic transition both underwrote arguments that human rights law had purchase and, 
paradoxically, also legitimated an approach whereby partial forms of accountability of those 
most responsible for the most serious violations would suffice.
55
  
 
(ii)    Humanitarian law.  Similar problems of fit and reinterpretation arose with regard to the 
application of humanitarian law. As with human rights law, towards the beginning of the 
1990s humanitarian law’s standards of accountability were not viewed as requiring post-
conflict accountability for violence in intrastate conflicts. Although humanitarian law has 
provisions dealing with non-state as well as state action, and was specifically designed for 
situations of conflict, arguments that humanitarian law required post-conflict accountability 
again had to be asserted and required an interpretive shift, similar to that of human rights law. 
 
Although from 1945 onwards there has been a clear legal framework in the Geneva 
Conventions imposing legal requirements on states to prosecute for grave breaches of 
international law taking place during international conflict, there was no clear requirement of 
a duty to prosecute in internal armed conflict. Only a sub-section of intrastate armed conflict 
is covered by humanitarian law – conflicts involving national liberation movements (Protocol 
I), and conflicts meeting the threshold tests of Protocol II and Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions.
56
 Even where an intrastate conflict does fall within humanitarian law’s 
parameters, states are often reluctant to concede its application and (unlike with human rights 
treaties) there is no supervisory body to enforce the Conventions rather there is an obligation 
on all states to ensure its implementation.
57
 Moreover, what these texts require as regards 
post-conflict accountability in internal conflict is not spelt out. There is no equivalent to the 
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explicit grave breaches regime that imposes an obligation to prosecute grave breaches of 
humanitarian law in international armed conflict. The argument that humanitarian law 
required post-conflict individual liability to be imposed through criminal law process 
required an interpretive revision.  
 
Over time, the application of individual criminal accountability to violations of humanitarian 
law in non-international armed conflict came to be firmly accepted in a range of state practice 
and judgments of international courts and tribunals.
58
 Moreover, the consequent duties to 
prosecute were understood to be on-going and therefore to have post-conflict application.
59
 
By 2005, international acceptance that humanitarian law imposed on-going accountability 
requiring individual criminal responsibility was apparently so comprehensive that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated as customary law that  
 
 individuals are responsible for war crimes committed in both international and non-
international armed conflict  
 states are required to investigate such war crimes and, if appropriate, prosecute 
 states have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts for such crimes60 
 
However, a further difficulty of fitting humanitarian law to intrastate conflict was Article 6(5) 
of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which appears to require amnesty, providing that  
 
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are 
interned or detained.  
 
As the pressure for post-conflict accountability increased states that had rejected the 
application of humanitarian law during the conflict began to turn to it in peace negotiations.
61
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This new-found attraction of states to humanitarian law lay in its perceived capacity to 
demand accountability, not just of the state, but of its non-state armed opponents, while also 
promoting mutual amnesty as a conflict-resolution tool. While peace settlements incorporated 
provisions taken from humanitarian law to non-state actors in conflicts, domestic courts 
began relying on Article 6(5) to justify amnesties and truth commissions against human rights 
challenges.
62
 
 
Combating this turn to humanitarian law as a justification for amnesty required an 
interpretive revision of humanitarian law as being consistent with human rights law. Faced 
with questions as to the scope of Article 6(5) in 1995 the ICRC produced an explanatory 
interpretation of international law’s one provision requiring amnesty.63 The ICRC argued that 
Article 6(5) had been designed to offer ‘the equivalent of what in international armed 
conflicts is known as “combatant immunity”’ that was implicitly limited by commitments to 
accountability:  
 
Article 6(5) attempts to encourage a release at the end of hostilities for those detained 
or punished for the mere fact of having participated in hostilities. It does not aim at an 
amnesty for those having violated international humanitarian law.
64
 
 
While the ICRC’s opinion clearly carries weight, the point remains that this opinion was 
driven by the need for internal regime coherence and also coherence with human rights law. 
The type of interpretation offered by the ICRC simply was not needed or given at the time of 
drafting (and does not appear in the contemporaneous commentary). The ICRC reading of 
Article 6(5) constituted an attempt to reconcile the Protocol’s requirement of amnesty, with 
the accountability requirements found in other parts of humanitarian law, and indeed human 
rights law, so as to further underwrite the emerging prohibition on amnesty. 
 
(iii)    International criminal justice    Post-conflict revisions of international human rights 
and humanitarian law were also reinforced by moves towards the use of international 
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criminal justice. In essence, international criminal law initiatives codified a merged regime of 
post-conflict accountability. The ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia created 
definitions of crimes that drew on the crimes of humanitarian law, concepts of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ and of gross human rights violations, but in ways that clearly addressed 
both international and internal conflict.
65
 A similar list of crimes was used by the Special 
Criminal Court of Sierra Leone.
66
 These provisions added to developing arguments of 
universal jurisdiction for grave breaches of humanitarian law and a move towards universal 
jurisdiction with respect to humanitarian law violations in internal conflict.
67
  
 
The merging of human rights and humanitarian law, with respect to defining international 
criminal law, was also followed by the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC).
68
 While originally conceived as a response to interstate 
conflict, with antecedents that long preceded the peace agreement era,
69
 the ICC’s eventual 
establishment took place against a backdrop of intrastate conflict and associated transitional 
justice developments. The Rome Statute framework of criminal responsibility, like that of the 
ad hoc tribunals and hybrid tribunals, offered a merged set of humanitarian and human rights 
legal standards capable of applying over a range of conflict scales and, most importantly for 
current discussion, not limited to either ‘internal’ or ‘international’ conflict.70 Importantly, 
the seismic normative development of a new international court and the lack of an explicit 
transitional justice exception, also spoke symbolically to amnesty of serious crimes as lifted 
out of the discretion of domestic and international mediators. Post-conflict accountability for 
serious international crimes now appeared to be a straightforward legal requirement of a 
hierarchical criminal justice regime, policed ultimately by the ICC. 
 
However, the scope for compromise was not entirely eliminated. Prosecuting strategies 
targeted only those most responsible and it soon became clear that very few perpetrators 
would ever see the inside of a court. As will be seen below, the application of international 
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criminal law to intrastate conflict did not entirely eliminate scope for restorative justice 
mechanisms. Rather, international criminal law, particularly pre-ICC, can be viewed as 
creating a ‘bifurcated approach’, whereby international criminal justice was to hold those 
‘most responsible’ to account, leaving more flexible quasi-law mechanisms to sweep up the 
rest. 
 
(iv)    Regime merge?    Over time, therefore, a prohibition of a blanket amnesty in intrastate 
conflict that nonetheless tolerates some unspecified forms of amnesty has emerged as a 
common denominator in both human rights and humanitarian law, now supported by 
international criminal law. This common denominator does not find a positive law 
articulation in any regime, but must be ‘read into’ a unified narrative of what the 
differentiated regimes collectively require. As one court has put it, the prohibition is a 
‘crystallising’ norm of international law derived from diverse legal sources.71 The corollary 
of a prohibition of blanket amnesty is that some level of amnesty is permitted and even 
required; here too the permissibility of amnesty must again be garnered from a variety of 
legal doctrines.
72
 The only direct treaty law provision for amnesty is Article 6(5) of Protocol 
II to the Geneva Conventions which only covers certain intrastate conflicts and which the 
ICRC contends does not apply to serious violations of humanitarian law. The international 
legality of limited amnesty is also supported by the view that some domestic amnesties are 
outside international law’s reach and still constitute a political matter within the gift of the 
state. 
 
The prohibition of a broad amnesty has been normatively endorsed in soft law standards and 
UN policy statements and practice. Throughout the 1990s soft law standards articulating 
normative requirements of accountability for mass atrocity referencing both human rights and 
humanitarian law regimes were developed. The 1989 Principles on the Effective Prevention 
and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, prohibits blanket 
immunity from prosecution for extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions in Article 19.
73
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Similarly, the 1993 UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances prevents special amnesty for disappearances.
74
 In 1997 the Joinet Principles 
provided a ‘Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through 
Action to Combat Impunity.’ Principle 25 sets out limits to amnesty, prohibiting its 
application to perpetrators of ‘serious crimes under international law’ while clearly 
contemplating that amnesty may be used nationally ‘when intended to establish conditions 
conducive to a peace agreement or to foster national reconciliation.’75  
 
These normative developments towards viewing forms of amnesty as unlawful were 
bolstered by UN practice and policy statements as the UN attempted to reconcile its 
peacemaking practices with its norm-promotion role. In July 1999, the UN Secretary-General 
Representative in Sierra Leone, on the instruction of the UN Secretary-General, added a 
proviso to the UN signature on the Lomé Agreement, between the Sierra Leonean 
government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) making it clear that the ‘United 
Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in Article IX of the agreement 
shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
other serious violations of humanitarian law’.76 This UN dissent served to ‘normativize’ and 
publicise its move towards a position as a ‘normative negotiator’. It can be argued that the 
Lomé rider, with its real-world impact in terms of UN signature and controversy, gave the 
prohibition on blanket amnesty instant legal effect in a way that statements of commitment 
and soft law standards could not. As will be seen, it also arguably paved the way for the 
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UNSC to later establish a Special Criminal Court for Sierra Leone that operated 
contemporaneously with the Truth Commission.
77
 
 
The new normative stance of the UN was reinforced on 10 December 1999 when the UN 
Secretary-General reported in a press release that he had issued guidelines addressing human 
rights and peace negotiations to his envoys.
78
 These guidelines, at time of writing, have not 
been made public.
79
 The UN direction towards clear prohibition of amnesty was further 
consolidated by an intervention by the UN Secretary-General in his August 2004, Report on 
The Rule of Law and Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, which reasserted a UN 
position of rejecting any endorsement of broad amnesty and capital punishment.
80
 In 2005, 
Orentlicher updated the Joinet Principles and in Principle 24 reiterated Joinet’s approach of 
prohibiting broad amnesties while contemplating some form of restricted amnesty as still 
possible.
81
  While the norms appear to articulate the two poles – accountability for serious 
violations of international law, and amnesty for lesser violations, there is little to no 
codification as to the grey area in the middle and where the line should be drawn. 
 
C    Normative (in)stability  
It can be argued that these standards operate to establish a broad and programmatic direction 
towards the prohibition of amnesty, which still leaves some, seemingly narrowing, room to 
manoeuvre. In practice, innovative institutional developments have attempted to work within 
these two poles. Thus, truth commissions that attempt to reconcile some amnesty with some 
accountability, or approaches that couple international criminal justice for the most serious 
offenders with some softer ‘restorative justice’ mechanism involving narratives of 
reconciliation rather than punishment for the majority of those involved in the conflict, have 
attempted to work within the normative poles of the new lex. However, as with the concept of 
hybrid self-determination, the compromise of the new law is apparently internally unstable. 
Neither human rights, nor humanitarian law, nor international criminal law have any explicit 
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provisions that require or permit balancing accountability for the past with a wider social 
‘good’ and human rights protection in the future, which can follow from achieving and 
sustaining a peace settlement. The new norm appears to try to hold together a middle ground 
that is squeezed by both ends: the desire to resolve the norm towards a more absolute and 
inflexible standard of prosecution and punishment in all cases on one hand, and the desire to 
retreat from it as unhelpful to peace negotiations on the other.  
 
While there have been some attempts to provide a normative blueprint that would spell out 
the boundaries and conditions of an explicitly ‘transitional’ form of justice, it has proved 
impossible to articulate a precise relationship between accountability and amnesty.
82
 It is 
suggested that it is impossible precisely because specification of the relationship would 
require an impossible-to-achieve shared understanding of the permissible goals of transition 
and consensus as to when these political considerations might attenuate the letter of human 
rights law. In the absence of such a shared understanding, any attempt to provide for an 
explicitly exceptional transitional justice runs the danger of undermining, rather than 
reinforcing, human rights and humanitarian law standards of accountability. 
 
 
9    A new law of third party intervention  
 
A    Traditional understandings  
Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter provide a formal legal basis for third party 
intervention in conflict and post-conflict settings. Chapter VI provides for Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes, Article 33 providing that  
 
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.  
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle 
their dispute by such means.  
                                                 
82
 A series of UN Commission and UN Council Resolutions on Transitional Justice have avoided attempting to 
articulate a relationship emphasising the need to provide for transitional justice and the rule of law and setting 
out some process matters, see for example, Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transitional Justice, Res. 
9/10 (2008); UN Human Rights Commission, Human Rights and Transitional Justice, Res. 2005/70 (2005). 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/16 
Page 32 of 57 
 
 
Chapter VI additionally empowers the UNSC to become involved and make 
recommendations for resolution of the conflict. However, there is no provision for enforcing 
these recommendations. 
 
Chapter VII provides for Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression, Article 39 providing that 
  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
 
Article 40 empowers the UNSC to call for provisional measures; Article 41 provides for 
enforcement not involving armed force, such as disruption of economic relations; Article 42 
provides that where other measures have proved inadequate, action involving armed force 
can be taken to address the conflict. 
 
As regards formally authorized intervention, under Chapter VI pacific resolution of the 
dispute can be taken with the consent of the parties in cases involving a threat or potential 
threat to international peace and security. Non-military and military actions can be taken 
without the consent of the party in the event that pacific resolution of the dispute fails and 
there is an actual threat to peace – by implication international peace. In practice, however, 
these chapters apply to formal Security Council authorized intervention. A range of other 
organizations can intervene as a matter of their own constitutions, provided they do not 
contravene the UN Charter.  
 
B    The lex pacificatoria  
The contemporary post-conflict environment relies heavily on a diverse range of international 
actors to carry out a diverse range of peace implementation functions. These functions can be 
categorized in terms of four broad tasks: policing demobilization and demilitarization; 
guaranteeing and implementing an internal constitutional settlement; mediating its 
development; and administering the transitional period in some form.  The scale and nature of 
international intervention is varied, ranging from full administration, to forms of 
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peacekeeping to involvement in domestic institutions, such as hybrid courts.
83
 Some forms of 
governance and peacekeeping are undertaken by the UN, some are UN authorized but 
conducted by regional groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
some, such as those in Iraq, are performed by third party states, and some are undertaken by 
‘international’ individuals with state endorsement but no clear representative capacity.84 
Discrete parts of the UN also become involved in separate issues, for example, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in return and repatriation of refugees and displaced 
persons.
85
 Other international organizations can also find themselves with peace 
implementation roles; for example, the International Labour Organization has played a role in 
the implementation of the San Andreas Agreement between the Ejército Zapatista de 
Liberación Nacional (EZLN) and the Mexican government, undertaken under the rubric of its 
treaty monitoring with relation to the International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (169).
86
 International ‘individuals’ and civil society actors 
can also be given third party implementation roles.. The main regulatory framework for these 
tasks is often the internal constitution of the institutions undertaking these tasks.  
 
Again, the assumptions of the traditional framework for regulating international intervention 
in conflicts appear inappropriate for the type of international intervention required and 
undertaken in pursuit of peace settlement implementation. The UN Charter framework does 
not envisage or address the broad range of possibilities for international involvement within 
states; for example, it does not provide a clear framework for the regulation of the 
intervention of regional organizations, now often equal or predominant players to the UN in 
mediation, peacekeeping and settlement implementation tasks.  
 
There are also further difficulties of ‘fit’ as regards Charter regulation of UNSC authorized 
intervention. In conflicts occurring largely within international state boundaries, it can 
sometimes be unclear when a threat constitutes a threat to international peace and security 
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and countries tend to resist the ‘internationalization’ of a conflict precisely because it puts 
their own sovereignty in question. Where a settlement framework is in place, and a tentative 
ceasefire holds, it can become even more difficult to justify post-conflict intervention in 
terms of a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the legal boundary as when 
international actors can forcibly intervene or not does not always relate appropriately to the 
nature of post-settlement implementation. Similarly, a distinction between consensual 
intervention and non-consensual intervention is difficult to apply in situations of political 
transition from one state structure to another, particularly when the new structures involve 
brokered compromise and power-sharing between former ‘state’ officials and their non-state 
opponents. In practice, consent may fluctuate and operations that were consent-based may 
need to move to a non-consensual basis very quickly. In the event that some parts of ‘the 
state’ withdraw their consent, but the state is being reconstructed whose consent is relevant? 
In short, the Charter framework contemplates a clear sovereign independent state, capable of 
giving or withholding consent, clear distinctions between peace and conflict and between 
international and non-international threats to peace. Post agreement, ambiguity over ‘who’ 
constitutes the state, and whether the war is over, means that such clarity seldom exists in 
periods of post-settlement transition. As regards other organizations and forms of 
intervention not requiring or having UNSC authorization, when and how they can intervene 
largely depend on the terms of their own constitutions.  
 
A practical pressure for the development of a lex pacificatoria to justify and govern third 
party intervention also comes from the need for international actors, focused on 
‘implementing’ democracy and the rule of law, to be able to articulate a legal basis for their 
own intervention. A legal grey zone relating to the basis and legality of the third party 
intervention can undermine third party implementation functions because it can be used by 
recalcitrant parties to the settlement to undermine those functions where they are resisting 
them. As Bertram notes with reference to the UN, legal challenges to third party 
implementation can  
 
[c]reate serious problems on the ground, undermining the credibility and capability of 
UN peace builders to carry out their missions. Inevitably, groups that stand to lose as 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper 2012/16 
Page 35 of 57 
 
a result of UN intervention will claim – legitimately or not – infringement of state 
sovereignty and the perception of infringement may also trigger popular opposition.
87
  
 
Again, the difficulty of lack of ‘fit’ of law to task and dilemmas has generated revisions in 
how the law applies. As regards UNSC authorized third party intervention, the authorizing 
resolutions tend to reference both consent and authorization and often remain silent and 
ambiguous as to whether they are Chapter VI or Chapter VII resolutions – the extension and 
development of a silent so-called VI ½ resolution as best suited to peace settlement 
enforcement. Interestingly, this development does not just involve international organizations 
being enabled to move from consent to use of force in Chapter VI-like initiatives, but also 
involves reaching back for consent in what are stated to be Chapter VII interventions. The 
use of international force in Kosovo, for example, was terminated by UNSC 1244, which 
made provision for international administration but attempted to build internal structures with 
reference to the Rambouillet Agreement.
88
 This draft agreement had been negotiated with the 
parties to the conflict, under the threat of use of force, but to which they had ultimately failed 
to agree – triggering the NATO intervention. The attempt to incorporate Rambouillet, post-
conflict, in a UNSC Resolution constituted an attempt to reach backwards for an element of 
consent from the recalcitrant parties in the state’s transitional structures.  
 
In many post-conflict situations, however, the UNSC is not involved . In these cases, as with 
both peacekeeping and the broader range of implementation functions undertaken by diverse 
third parties, the peace agreement itself often serves as a ‘quasi-legal’ basis for third party 
legitimacy and intervention – capable of both authorizing, defining and limiting third party 
tasks, effectively bypassing questions of consent. The constitutional and treaty-like nature of 
the hybrid self-determination settlement terms creates a situation in which the involvement of 
third parties can be presented not as an exception to sovereignty and self-determination, but 
part-and-parcel of achieving it. The necessary consent is of all the parties (domestic and 
international) to the peace settlement itself. 
 
C    Normative (in)stability  
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The emergent ‘lex pacificatoria’ in the area of third party intervention remains vague, general 
and operating at a political and programmatic level. It is difficult to imagine coherent reform 
of the UN Charter to enable authorization of a broader range of peace agreements. 
Developments in understandings of what the Charter permits have been addressed by 
consecutive UN Secretary-Generals in a series of ‘lessons learned’ reports that tried to 
grapple with, and revise, concepts of ‘consent’, ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ in the context 
of post-conflict reconstruction tasks that often required the redistribution of power within the 
state.
89
  
 
10    A new law of third party accountability  
 
A    Traditional understandings  
Traditionally, the spheres of operation of international organizations and the sphere of 
operation of the state domestically were understood to be distinct: international organizations 
existed to pursue common state interests, such as taking collective action with respect to 
common or global problems. The accountability of state actors was through the framework of 
the state’s institutions and accountability of international actors through the framework of the 
international organization’s institutions. In so far as international organizations committed 
wrongs within states, any accountability was contemplated from the international 
organization to the state, however, when and how accountability applied remained 
controversial, depending on matters such as the relationship between the organization and its 
member states and what acts were attributable to the organization.
90
  
 
B    The lex pacificatoria  
Again, these assumptions are inapposite to post-conflict scenarios and tasks.  The tapestry to 
international involvement in peace settlement implementation tasks, as described in 6 above, 
gives rise to questions of third party accountability for violations of international law with 
respect to local populations. Two exercises of power in particular give rise to demands for 
accountability to local populations: the use of force and the exercise of what are normally the 
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powers of government. When international implementers use force and exercise 
governmental functions they, in essence, carry out the business of the state. The exercise of 
what is normally conceived of as domestic government by international actors, like all use of 
public power, can give rise to human rights violations. Local populations have asserted that 
the third parties are themselves violating legal rights found in international human rights and 
humanitarian law and indeed the domestic framework of peace settlements. Tn practice 
challenges to the actions of peacekeepers have included challenges to the use of force,
91
 
charges of sexual abuse,
92
 use of administrative detention
93
 and, in Bosnia, challenges to the 
constitutionality of the exercise of domestic legislative power by the Office of the High 
Representative.
94
 Human rights challenges require a response from third parties because 
human rights abuses undermine peace settlement implementation efforts by undermining 
third party legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Given that peace building typically 
involves a re-allocation of power from one side in the conflict to another, challenges to third 
party legitimacy tend to be seized on by ‘spoilers’, that is, recalcitrant parties who view 
settlement failure as their desired outcome, and can help build their political base locally.
95
  
 
While the application of human rights and humanitarian law seems relevant, again both 
regimes have difficulties of fit. The post-conflict environment, with its hybrid 
international/domestic actors and ambiguous sovereignty, does not sit easily with the 
assumptions of either human rights or humanitarian law. The accountability offered by each 
regime is inadequate, both in reach and in enforcement mechanism, for dealing with the third 
party accountability issues that arise. The normal assumption that the state is able and capable 
of being the primary locus of human rights accountability does not prevail. The peculiarity of 
transitions from conflict gives rise to pressure for a form of regime merge that, in its broad 
dynamic, is similar to that described with reference to transitional justice.  
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(i) Human rights law    Human rights law is acknowledged to apply in situations of conflict 
and of peace and the standards it offers appear to have the capacity to hold international 
implementers to account, to the extent that they are using force or undertaking governmental-
type roles. Human rights treaties impose a high standard of protection with regard to the right 
to life, capable of providing for accountability for killings by peacekeepers. Their strength, 
but also their weakness, is that they contemplate such killings as something other than 
potentially legitimate acts of war. As regards international governance, human rights 
standards are specifically designed to provide accountability for the exercise of government 
power, vis-à-vis the individual, and so would seem to be relevant to international 
administrators when they exercise the powers of the state. Finally, in the event that states fail 
to provide mechanisms for adjudicating on human rights breaches, unlike humanitarian law, 
there is international machinery, in the form of treaty mechanisms, capable of providing for 
some form of adjudication of a breach. 
 
The difficulty is that human rights treaties regulate relationships between a state and the 
people within its borders, with the state obligated to deliver rights as minimum standards. As 
a technical matter, the rights contained in international conventions only apply to the state 
parties that sign the conventions, and so therefore do not apply directly to international 
organisations. The application of existing rights mechanisms to international organisations, 
including the UN, is not obvious and remains legally controversial.
96
 While mission 
mandates and regulations can provide for international organizations to undertake duties in 
ways that protect and promote human rights,
97
 these seldom provide for a clear mechanism 
through which victims of rights violations can pursue accountability. There are similar 
difficulties with the application of customary international law to international organizations. 
Although the state technically retains its on-going treaty and customary law human rights 
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commitments, having abrogated its power to international organizations, and often having 
given them immunity at point of entry through status of forces agreements, it cannot 
effectively hold international actors to account.  
 
In response, commentators have posited a range of legal routes to finding the UN 
accountable.
98
 Some commentators have contended that human rights apply directly to the 
UN by virtue of the constitutional standing of the UN Charter in combination with the 
International Covenants on Civil, Political and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 
1966.
99
 This argument views UN administrators as bound by human rights standards as part 
of its own constitution. Others have found jus cogens and customary law obligations to be 
directly applicable to UN administrators, given the UN’s status as a subject of international 
law.
100
 A third route to application finds the UN to be subject to human rights norms through 
its usurpation of the state’s functions – either as surrogate state, or as derivative or successor 
of the state. Each line of argument could, in theory, apply also to regional peacekeeping in 
terms of the respective constitutional foundations of the relevant regional organisation (which 
also have roots in the UN Charter framework). The very existence of these arguments, 
however, testifies to an unhelpful lack of clarity as to UN human rights obligations. 
Moreover, these UN accountability theories leave the accountability of non-state third parties, 
such as non-governmental organizations, private security contractors, companies and 
individual actors, untouched.  
 
Third party ‘home’ states would seem, in principle, to retain treaty responsibility to pursue 
the accountability of their own personnel. This form of accountability is unsatisfactory for 
local populations as it seems to deliver accountability to the wrong constituency. 
Nevertheless, it is a form of accountability. However, asserting home state accountability in 
practice has exposed clear limitations on when treaty obligations apply.
101
 Cases asserted 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, for example, have determined that  
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 the Convention is primarily applicable territorial but can apply to states acting extra-
territorially when they ‘exercise all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised’ by governments; or exercise effective control over the area in which they 
operate
102
  
 however, where the mission is formally authorized by the United Nations, UN SC 
authorization to carry out a specific operation or use ‘use all necessary measures’ may 
legitimize actions which would otherwise violate human rights standards
103
  
 and where the operation is a UN one, responsibility lies with the UN rather than the 
contributing states
104
 
 
(ii) Humanitarian law.   Similar difficulties apply with reference to the application of 
humanitarian law. Once again, it is unclear that this body of law applies to the peacekeeping 
forces of international organisations. While most UN states are state parties to the Geneva 
Conventions, the UN itself is not and direct accession has apparently been ruled out.
105
 As 
Cerone notes, a further query over application lies in ‘the notion that operations undertaken 
pursuant to the Chapter VII power of the SC are somehow exempt from the ordinary 
application of international law, such that even the IHL obligations of the member states 
participating in the operation are inapplicable.’106 International legal accountability for 
private actors, to whom third party states contract-out peace-implementation duties, is even 
more unclear.
107
 Moreover, the starting point of UN operations has been to provide for the 
immunity of peacekeeping and mission personnel from host jurisdiction. It has been standard 
practice for UN and regional terms of agreements between the international organization and 
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the host state to include immunity for its personnel, and now often also for private 
contractors.
108
  
 
Humanitarian law’s standards also seem inapposite to the type of accountability sought by 
local actors. As regards the use of force, humanitarian law authorizes the use of lethal force 
against enemy combatants and permits some margin of error with regard to the collateral 
killing of civilians. Military action involving large number of civilian casualties is legitimate, 
as long as the intention was to target enemy combatants, adequate planning and precautions 
were taken, and appropriate means used, even if large scale civilian loss of life results. 
However, as Hadden writes, where peacekeepers are responsible for civilian deaths the result 
‘will often be to cause a substantial reduction in the perceived legitimacy and acceptability of 
the international forces.’109 Reliance on humanitarian law, which includes more scope for 
lawful killing than human rights law, undercuts the very concept of the political landscape as 
‘post-conflict.’ 
 
As regards the broader governance roles of international actors and violations of rights other 
than the right to life, again there is a mismatch between humanitarian law’s rationale, 
assumptions and standards and the governance functions undertaken by third parties 
implementing contemporary transitions from conflict. For standards addressing the broader 
governance roles of third parties, one must look to humanitarian law’s regulation of 
occupation. Geneva IV and the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land of 1907, regulate an occupation, regardless of whether it is legal or not. 
Recourse to the law of occupation, however, is not automatic for international administrators. 
As Ratner notes, UN missions have tended to assume the priority of the human rights 
framework of accountability, while state-led international administrations have tended to 
view humanitarian law as the governing framework.
110
 He argues that regime choice is more 
a ‘default position’ than a choice, determined by the nature of the third party. International 
administrations tend to be run by civilians and so assume the primacy of human rights law, 
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while state interventions run by military personnel tend to automatically turn to humanitarian 
law.
111
  
 
Where humanitarian law is viewed as the appropriate framework there are further difficulties 
of fit, based on its lack of provision for a concept of ‘transformative occupation.’112 The 
underlying rationale driving the standards is an attempt to prevent the illegality of acquiring 
territory by force.
113
 The law aims to protect the occupied state from being incorporated into 
the territory of the occupier. Therefore, ‘the watchword is the legal maintenance of the status 
quo while protecting the basic welfare of the population, pending a final disposition of 
territory, typically a withdrawal from it.’114 The difficulty for contemporary transitions is that 
rules designed to restrict an occupier’s capacity to reshape the state’s internal configuration 
also restrict third parties, whose implementation function under a peace agreement is 
precisely that of ‘transforming’ state structures. Geneva IV limits on occupiers preclude 
actions that peacekeepers undertake as a matter of practice, such as disapplying former laws, 
involvement in constitutional reform and associated substantive reform of political and legal 
institutions.
115
 The whole point of international implementation of contemporary transitions 
is to move away from the status quo associated with a war towards a situation in which the 
laws of war do not apply. International implementers aim to achieve this precisely by 
changing institutions and government by agreement. The assumptions and remit of the 
international humanitarian law of occupation and its modalities of accountability seem 
inapposite to the third party enforcement tasks of international organizations. This has led to 
alternative forms of legal authorization being sought post-conflict. In Iraq, for example, the 
move towards ending occupation led to UN SC resolutions being used to create extraordinary 
occupation powers, through using the argument that Geneva IV did not provide for the needs 
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of a gradual transition, such as the need for occupiers to engage in domestic constitutional 
reform, or management of oil resources.
116
  
 
A third difficulty in fitting humanitarian law to post-conflict pressures for accountability is 
that it appears to offer accountability of international actors to the ‘wrong’ people. 
Accountability for third party actions is contemplated to lie with the domestic legal 
mechanisms of the third party state, with little formal international machinery to force states 
to comply and no treaty monitoring mechanism.
117
 Whether use of force or other violations of 
rights are at issue, for local parties the perception, and mostly the reality, is that international 
actors have de facto immunity from the international norms that they promote locally.
118
 In 
short, there is a perceived ‘accountability gap’ between local populations and international 
implementer, which is not addressed by home state accountability in either principle or in 
practice. 
 
The difficulty of fitting and applying either humanitarian law or human rights regime to the 
post-conflict tasks that third parties undertake again can be argued to be producing forms of 
regime merge and institutional innovation.  
 
(iii)    Regime merge?   Post-conflict accountability pressures have forced attempts at new 
normative articulations. It can be argued that the hybrid international-domestic, war-no war, 
post-conflict environment prompts recourse to the provisions of both human rights and 
humanitarian law regimes. Again, this turn to both regimes is not a process of orderly 
harmonization with priority being given to the most appropriate lex specialis where standards 
cannot be reconciled. As Ratner, Roberts, and Stahn have all pointed out (from slightly 
different perspectives), the political context of post-conflict peace-building efforts points 
towards the need to view the laws of occupation and human rights law as, in some sense, a 
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harmonised regime capable of servicing the needs of the contemporary transition.
119
 In 
practice, regime merge has involved an attempt to eclectically draw on the ‘spirit’ or 
‘observance’ of the regimes as both offering relevant standards, but mediating the strict legal 
application of those standards so as to balance it with peace-building imperatives.
120
 The 
attempt at formulating new normative guidance is a complex effort to apply different 
standards to different third party functions by applying different standards to different actors, 
or different standards to the same actors when exercising different functions. Normative and 
institutional innovation illustrates the ways in which ‘the spirit’ or ‘values’ of the regimes are 
invoked, rather than their strict application.  
 
The search for accountability again reaches out to pluck from humanitarian law, human rights 
law, and criminal law, eclectically and often simultaneously. The point can be illustrated by a 
glance at some of the attempts at norm-development, aimed at filling the accountability gap 
left by the lack of fit of human rights and humanitarian law. In 1999, for example, the UN 
Secretary-General issued a Bulletin providing for the ‘Observance by United Nations forces 
of international humanitarian law.’121 This Bulletin sets out a subset of humanitarian law 
provisions that are to apply to UN forces in situations of conflict when ‘they are actively 
engaged therein as combatants’.122 It provides that, in Status of Forces Agreements concluded 
between the UN and a host state, the UN will undertake to ensure that the force ‘shall 
conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions 
applicable to the conduct of military personnel.’123 However, violations of humanitarian law 
are to be prosecuted in the national courts of the contributing state.
124
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In 2000, UNSC Resolution 1325 stated the UN’s willingness to incorporate a ‘gender 
perspective’ into peacekeeping operations and urged the Secretary-General ‘to ensure that, 
where appropriate, field operations include a gender component.’125 In 2006, a UN Group of 
Legal Experts, established in response to concerns about sexual violence committed by 
peacekeepers, submitted a report to the General Assembly on the Accountability of United 
Nations staff and experts on mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping 
operations.
126
 The Report’s emphasis was on placing criminal law accountability with the 
host state, however, it also raised the possibility that hybrid domestic-international tribunals 
might be an innovative way to enable local justice, whilst responding to concerns of 
contributing states as to fair process and human rights protections for their staff.
127
 The 
Report’s attempt to plug accountability gaps remained limited as it only contemplated 
criminal accountability in cases such as sexual abuse, which by their nature fell outside the 
definition of ‘acts performed in the exercise of their official functions’, and contemplated an 
on-going backdrop of UN immunity.
128
 The Expert Group appended a Draft Convention on 
the criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission, which included these 
limitations,
129
 and also the limitation that the convention ‘not apply to military personnel of 
national contingents assigned to the military component of a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation’ and to other persons who status-of-forces agreements stated were ‘under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a State other than the host state.’130  
 
Regional organizations have also moved towards standard forms of codified application of 
international legal standards. For example, as Hadden documents, the European Union (EU) 
has developed a series of documents providing for general standards of conduct for all EU 
Missions,
131
 and guidelines for mainstreaming human rights and gender.
132
 These documents 
set out principles aimed at ‘behavioural’ standards of conduct and procedures for 
implementation, which include a requirement that provision be made for procedures of 
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complaints and reporting misconduct. While extending clarified standards for accountability 
to EU Missions, discipline remains to be provided for by ‘national authorities’, or heads of 
missions in the case of ‘contracted personnel’.  
 
In addition to codification, attempts have been made to provide a level of accountability 
through the legal instruments that establish the peace operation. In particular, since the 1990s 
Status of Forces Agreements of the UN (SOFAs), while providing for immunity of troops 
from local state jurisdiction, have also begun to ‘contract’ some application of human rights 
and humanitarian law by including references in their provisions. Although these agreements 
reaffirm the immunity of UN Troops from local jurisdiction, they now also contain provision 
for ‘full respect for the principles and spirit of conventions concerning military personnel’, 
.
133
 However, at the EU level the EU Model Status of Forces and EU Model Status of 
Mission Agreements, promulgated initially in 2005, have been criticized for conferring a 
more extensive set of privileges and immunities on EU operations than current international 
practice warrants.
134
 Neither do these Model Agreements include any provision, similar to 
that of the UN Model Code, providing for ‘full respect for the spirit and principles’ of 
humanitarian law.  
 
Civilian missions can similarly be contracted or regulated into some form of human rights 
commitment. In Kosovo, UNMIK Regulation 1 provides that ‘all persons undertaking public 
duties or holding public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized human 
rights standards and shall not discriminate against any person on any ground…’.135 The 
limitation of these provisions is that it is somewhat unclear what respecting the ‘principles 
and spirit’ of the conventions, or ‘observing’ the standards, requires in practice and the 
mechanism for enforcement remains organizational disciplinary structures or home state 
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criminal law jurisdiction, meaning that an accountability gap persists as regards local 
populations.
136
  
  
The pressure for direct accountability to local populations, however, has resulted in another 
route to third party accountability, through ad hoc institutional innovation. For example, an 
ombudsperson’s office was set up in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with the 
ombudsperson authorized to receive complaints against all the people employed by the UN, 
as well as against personnel working for local authorities, but with no enforcement 
mechanism.
137
 In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK has taken steps in effect to ‘accede’ to 
human rights conventions through technical agreements with the Council of Europe that 
bring them within the supervision mechanisms of the Convention on the Prevention of 
Torture and the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities.
138
 These 
agreements state that UNMIK is to provide the relevant information through a specifically 
designed reporting mechanism and so bypass the difficulties of a technical accession to the 
Conventions. A further step towards accountability took place in 2006 when an international 
Human Rights Advisory Panel was established to ‘examine complaints from any person or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by UNMIK of the human rights 
of [eight human rights conventions]’.139 The crafting of the Advisory Panel’s jurisdiction 
operates practically to incorporate the conventions domestically as regards UNMIK, by 
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providing a domestic mechanism for their application.
140
 Other ad hoc accountability 
mechanisms include a Personnel Conduct Committee in the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL), and the Code of Conduct Committee in the United Nations Operation in 
Burundi. Both of these involved quasi-judicial mechanisms, with no enforcement arm, in 
response to well-publicised abuses.
141
 
 
To this example an exceptional instance of host state accountability over international actors 
can be added.
142
 In Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) provision established the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR) as the ‘theatre of final authority’ for the entire 
agreements and these powers were subsequently extended to include the power to legislate 
when the domestic legislature was log-jammed.
143
 The Bosnian Constitutional Court was 
subsequently repeatedly asked to consider the constitutionality of this OHR-promulgated 
legislation. In response the court asserted that ‘the mandate of the High Representative 
derives from Annex 10 of the [DPA], the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Council and the Bonn Declaration and that the mandate and the exercise of the mandate are 
not subject to the control of the Constitutional Court.’144 Nevertheless, the Court 
simultaneously found that, ‘in so far as the High Representative intervenes into the legal 
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the laws enacted by him are, by their nature, domestic 
laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose conformity with the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can be examined by the Constitutional Court.’145 In this move, the constitutional 
court whose authority derives from one of the DPA’s sub-Annexes, empowered itself to 
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review the actions of the OHR who is the ‘final theatre of authority’ for the whole agreement 
– enforcement inversion whereby international actors are accountable through domestic 
institutions, rather than holding them to account. This innovation illustrates the capacity of 
peace agreement dilemmas of fit to reshape and reconstruct both the international, and indeed 
the domestic legal order, established by the peace agreement. The Bosnian Constitutional 
Court’s assumption of jurisdiction created a new relationship between international enforcer 
and domestic court (in this case itself an internationalized court), that reconfigured the third 
party role with respect to the peace agreement as treaty.  
 
The above innovations illustrate the diversity of ad hoc attempts to respond to legitimacy 
crises which attempt to restore a connection between accountability mechanism and those 
whose rights are violated. The mechanisms both respond to the mix of international and 
domestic actors in the post-conflict state and further construct the post-conflict state as a 
space of hybrid governance characterized by transnational legal pluralism.  
 
C    Normative (in)stability  
In the area of third party accountability the development of a lex pacificatoria is incomplete 
and ad hoc. Some of the difficulties of applying norms to international organization are a 
specific version of the broader difficulty with the accountability of international organizations 
under contemporary international law.
146
 However, part of the difficulty in this context is the 
complex innovation, as regards the use of international third parties in peace settlement 
implementation tasks, and the difficulty international law-making has with catching up. 
Moreover, the task of ‘catching up’ is difficult as it is unlikely that one instrument could ever 
capture the full range of third parties and third party functions. Third parties include a range 
of other actors, private actors, judges, non-governmental organizations and donors, many of 
whom stand beyond international law’s easy reach and whose functions would require 
specifically tailored standards.
147
  
 
As a result, the very partial lex pacificatoria that has emerged can be conceived of as 
establishing a broad framework for accountability, namely that  
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 international human rights law, humanitarian law, domestic constitutional law 
principles and the peace agreement itself, should all be understood to provide 
standards relevant to the accountability of third parties for their transitional actions, 
and that  
 the more third party actors take on functions of governance, the more they should be 
accountable through international human rights commitments, however that 
accountability is achieved; and  
 the longer third party actors undertake functions of governance, the more they should 
be accountable through domestic legal and political processes, however that 
accountability is achieved. 
 
However, these principles must be drawn from across quite different existing legal standards, 
judgments and practices. A recent report by Hampson in 2005 illustrates the complexity of 
fashioning any accountability regime which would cut across the complexity of third party 
functions in this context. Tellingly, and perhaps ambiguously, entitled ‘Administration of 
Justice, Rule of Law and Democracy’ the report addresses the accountability of ‘international 
personnel’ taking part in peace support operations and aims to address a broad cross section 
of third party post-conflict roles: civilian and military personnel, international experts, 
international civil servants and others, such as the foreign staff of non-governmental 
organizations. It documents the complex, overlapping and chaotic types of immunity that 
pertain, and the equally complex, overlapping and chaotic range of constituencies to whom 
accountability is owed, all of which point to different venues for determining 
accountability.
148
 As demonstrated above, in place of coherent formal legal accountability, 
soft law norms have been fashioned, providing for a range of different accountabilities for 
different types of actors, together with a set of ad hoc mechanisms providing for 
accountability of some actors in particular conflicts, or attempts to ‘contract’ such obligations 
into the legal instruments that ‘contract’ the international implementers into their tasks.  
 
11    From lex pacificatoria to jus post bellum?  
The attempt to apply international law to transitions from conflict has produced re-
interpretations of key international legal doctrines which operate to re-shape what are 
understood to be the boundaries of international legal regimes and, indeed, international law 
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itself. It has been argued throughout that the attempt to use international law to regulate peace 
agreement settlements and their implementation has required new accounts of how 
international law applies and what it demands. These new accounts have re-worked the scope 
and concerns of core international legal regimes, such as refugee law, human rights law and 
humanitarian law, so as to address the peculiar political dilemmas of transition. I have termed 
these new developments a new lex pacificatoria or ‘law of the peacemakers’. 
 
In each case, however, any shift in international legal doctrine is partial and unstable and it is 
unclear whether the interpretations will be sustained, developed, or rolled back. It is that the 
new lex does not operate as a clear new legal regime establishing a set of legal obligations. 
Rather, it operates as a set of programmatic standards that provide guidance and, at times, go 
further in creating a normative expectation as to how the dilemmas of peace settlements can 
be resolved concomitantly with the requirements of international law.  
 
The very partiality and instability of the lex pacificatoria means that it is tempting to view it 
as a lex deferenda, or ‘developing law’, whose natural trajectory would seem to be towards a 
more established, clearly legal, and fully worked out body of law capable of applying to 
transitions from conflict. Indeed, it has been argued that the types of developments outlined 
in this chapter point to a need for, and indeed the development of, a jus post bellum that 
extends and develops concepts of jus ad bello and jus in bello to provide a differentiated 
application of current legal regimes to the post-conflict phase; a ‘post-conflict needs’ 
argument has been central to driving discussion of a jus post bellum in recent years.
149
 
Lawyers dislike ‘quasi’ legal regimes, laws that do not contemplate or fit the facts, and 
radical legal pluralism, whereby it is constantly unclear which legal regime applies and has 
precedence. From this dislike derives an instinct to codify a jus post bellum that would 
regulate post-conflict dilemmas more clearly and more appropriately. If international law is 
now a law of regimes, and the post-conflict environment has no specific or appropriate 
regime, then, the argument runs, it now needs one.  
 
A second driver for jus post bellum discourse, however, lies in the link between the waging 
of international armed conflict and a justificatory discourse rooted in the need to transform 
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the targeted state, in particular to prevent human rights abuses.
150
 In the international armed 
conflicts of recent years, the legality of intervention has been disputed in many key cases, 
namely, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Against the challenge to legality, talk of a jus post 
bellum has been driven by attempts to link the practice of intervention to questions of the 
morality of war and just war theory. Where there are concerns over the legality of the war, 
arguments of the need for state transformation have been used either to bolster arguments of 
lawfulness or to suggest that ‘technical’ unlawfulness is overcome by a higher moral good. 
Both types of justification of armed intervention are undermined if the resultant state is not 
transformed. An illegal or unjust war can be legitimated retrospectively by achieving a 
measure of justice for the citizens of the country attacked, while a legal or just war it would 
seem should achieve a just result and can be understood as ‘unjust’ if it does not.  To the 
extent the legal arguments are built on the case for humanitarian intervention, then the justice 
arguments and the legality arguments are connected.  
 
Both these drivers indicate the practical political, legal, and moral reasons to reach for a 
distinctive jus post bellum. In conclusion, however, this chapter will address whether a new 
and distinct jus post bellum is either possible or desirable.  
 
A    Is a jus post bellum possible?  
There are a number of practical problems impinging on whether a more fully fledged jus post 
bellum can be achieved. Firstly, it is unclear who would design and sign up to any new 
regime. Practices of international law-making are complex and typically protracted. Multi-
lateral treaties involve complex and lengthy interstate negotiations that increasingly involve a 
host of other actors. There is no clear will or capacity to agree a new ‘fifth’ Geneva 
Convention or suchlike.  
 
Secondly, even if the will did exist it is unlikely that consensus could be reached on the 
content of any new regime. Attempts to codify, even in soft law standards, some of the ‘new 
law’s’ current content have often foundered or produced very vague general principles. This 
failure owes more to the difficulty of the subject matter than to a lack of commitment or will. 
It is difficult to contain the consequence of any new standard, for how we understand the 
legal regimes to apply in less controversial settings. For example, will a new standard on 
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transitional justice strengthen or water down existing human rights provision; how is an 
explicitly transitional justice to be articulated – as an exception to norms demanding 
accountability, or a differentiated application of them appropriate to the transitional state; 
what is the definition of ‘transition’ to which this ‘different’ form of justice would apply? 
Where soft law guidance currently exists it relates to one dimension of transition – refugees, 
transitional justice, gender, or third party accountability. It is difficult to imagine how the 
developing soft law of these disparate areas could be woven into a coherent, unified formal 
legal regime capable of regulating all aspects of transition.  
 
Thirdly, while the pressure for a new international legal regime arises in part to escape the 
boundary dilemmas of existing regimes, a new regime would merely present a new set of 
‘boundary’ dilemmas. To which types and scales of conflict would the new regime apply? 
The very scale of peace agreement practice illustrates the diverse conflict situations to which 
a jus post bellum might be argued to apply: fully fledged international wars, Protocol II non-
international armed conflict, conflict governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and conflict that falls outside humanitarian law definitions altogether. When is a 
conflict the type that triggers a jus post bellum? If the categories of humanitarian and human 
rights law are to be merged, then the concept of the relevant ‘conflict’ also becomes more 
fluid . Are there any limits to what situation a new jus post bellum would apply in?: what type 
of conflict and political transition suffices?  How and when is it decided that a situation is 
‘post’-conflict? Peace settlements are often only partially implemented, with sporadic or 
sustained violence re-emerging. Post-settlement is not the same as ‘post-conflict’, although 
the literature often assumes that it is. Often, no consensus exists between any of the parties 
(including international third parties) as to whether a situation is ‘post-conflict’, or when a 
distinctive ‘transition’ begins and ends. Without a clear sense of such boundaries it is unclear 
when the differentiated standards of any jus post bellum would begin or end. The fluctuating 
nature of post-conflict violence indicates a difficulty in deciding when any new jus post 
bellum might apply.  
 
B    Is a jus post bellum desirable?  
These practical problems prompt the question of whether a new ‘third-way’ post-conflict 
regime is desirable. It can be argued that the partial nature of the lex pacificatoria leaves vital 
room for negotiations. It can be argued that the consent of the parties to a conflict to new 
political and legal arrangements is vital to ending a conflict. Guidelines for what peace 
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agreements should include, therefore, may be more appropriate to enabling negotiated 
solutions, rather than using international law to require particular substantive outcomes. A 
broad sketching of the possible parameters of amnesty, exhortations to include women and 
‘best practice’ guidance on the return of refugees and displaced persons leave some room for 
the parties to negotiate solutions with some flexibility. What is lost in the give and take may 
be gained in the commitment and ability to implement whatever is agreed. Binding 
international legal standards making detailed provision on what is required in each area 
would effectively operate to require a particular blueprint of any political deal, narrowing the 
parties’ room to manoeuvre. The more law specifies peace settlement terms, the less the 
parties are able to negotiate. Rather than guiding negotiations, a new regime would run the 
risk of effectively establishing legal pre-requisites for any end of the conflict.  
 
More positively, the partially-formed state of the lex pacificatoria may assist and enable 
agreement to some normative framework for resolving conflicts. At present, the ‘new law’ of 
peacemakers operates as a holding device for disagreement over what law and conflict 
resolution requires and should require. For example, in the area of transitional justice, it holds 
together the idea that both accountability and amnesty are useful and permissible and some 
sense of where the line should be drawn between them. In the undefined middle space lie 
possibilities for negotiated settlement.  As the area of transitional justice illustrates, a project 
of bringing ‘clarity’ to a jus post bellum almost inevitably involves excluding the middle 
ground, the search for which has driven the new developments. This middle ground – the 
only ground on which international actors can find agreement – is often the same middle 
ground that enables the parties to conflict to reach agreement.  
  
A second danger to moving to a jus post bellum pertains. The new boundary disputes of a 
new jus post bellum regime create the possibility that, to the extent that a jus post bellum 
allows for an exceptional application of humanitarian or human rights law, this exceptionality 
would begin to creep through to all applications. The boundary disputes created by the 
category, in particular the difficulty of defining ‘post-conflict’ or ‘transition’, open up the 
possibility of attenuating human rights standards indefinitely, of using humanitarian law in 
times of peace and even a self-serving selective grab of international enforcers of enabling 
provisions, such as ‘administrative detention’, cut free from their overarching framework of 
accountability.  
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Third, whether the jus post bellum is viewed as a useful development of international law, 
will depend on what view is taken of the political import of any jus post bellum, with 
reference to the underlying justification for international law-making itself. The desirability 
and shape of any jus post bellum will depend on an account of the the current situating of 
international law as post-Westphalian and whether this situation is viewed positively or 
negatively.  
 
If the project of international law is seen as having moved from the ‘international law’ of 
states to the ‘international law of regimes’, then the creation of a new regime may perhaps be 
understood as inevitable, but will be evaluated differently by those who think specialist 
regimes are a useful development of international law and those who are concerned about 
international law’s fragmentation. Beyond a general concern with fragmentation, sterner 
critiques of international law as the ‘law of regimes’ have been made, namely that 
understanding international law as a law of regimes repositions international lawyers as 
regime experts, and the politics and majesty of international law becomes lost in a series of 
inter-regime battles approached as technocratic projects.
151
 From this point of view, even the 
technocratic project of ‘fixing mess’ by clarifying post-conflict soft law as a ius post bellum, 
has a politics, being the politics of obscuring what is at stake in regime disputes of experts.
152
  
 
Alternatively, if the post-Westphalian project of international law is viewed as the 
international promotion, and even requirement, of liberal statehood, then one may view the 
current lex pacificatoria’s incomplete nature as a way-station towards achieving a clearer jus 
post bellum.  However, the parameters of this ius will be set by the goal of achieving liberal 
democratic statehood. The project of embracing and building a new jus post bellum would, 
from this perspective, become very explicitly tied up with ensuring the emergence of a liberal 
democratic state and its components would be developed so as to ensure that such a state is 
delivered. Thus, some of the more fluid dimensions of the lex pacificatoria would be rejected 
in the codification, or tolerated only to the extent that they were expressly transitional. For 
example, power-sharing and group rights might be tolerated short-term, but with pressure to 
move towards individual elections, and rights and short term amnesties might be tolerated 
with a pressure to move to full human rights accountability for all. Moreover, a liberal 
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international lawyer may be predisposed to reasserting the state as the only appropriate 
power-holder whose monopoly on the use of force must be bolstered to include the 
punishment of non-state actors all aimed at installing a standard set of legal and political 
institutions. However, if the development of liberal peace-making is viewed sceptically, these 
attempts may be resisted in favour of acknowledging and working with prevailing domestic 
power-structures – even when profoundly illiberal, while understanding the contingent nature 
of both state and non-state legitimacy. It can also be argued that such a project will inevitably 
result in any case.  Case studies question whether what emerges from liberal peacemaking 
practices is in fact ‘liberal peace’ or a hybrid variant where top-down imposition of liberal 
institutions compete with bottom-up resistance operating to preserve indigenous power 
structures, which often subvert the liberal peace-making project.
153
  The role of law, from this 
perspective, would perhaps be one of a limited ambition aimed at constructive engagement 
with the dynamic of imposition and resistance, rather than an attempt to require, ever more 
militarily forcibly, a move towards western liberal values and institutions. 
 
Finally, there are those who may be sceptical of a jus post bellum on realist grounds, namely 
that its strong association with the justifications for international intervention mean that it 
cannot be separated from uni-polar attempts to pursue the interests of the United States and 
its allies, and that its development and application cannot resist being subverted to those 
ends. From this perspective, the move from existing regimes of human rights and 
humanitarian law may be viewed suspiciously as enabling their selective application in 
pursuit of the ambitions of the international hegemon. The enabling parts of regimes, for 
example, administrative detention, could be lifted free from wider constraints, for example, 
those preventing ‘transformative occupation’, with few new constraints being put in place by 
the new regime.  
 
12    Conclusion  
The term lex pacificatoria in its allusion to the lex mercatoria has a descriptive accuracy in 
its allusion to a body of law that operates somewhere between binding international law and 
not law. It also points to the contingent nature of the developments and the possibility both 
for further development, but also for retreat. It does not signal a fully fledged regime as a 
possible, or desirable, end point of current developments, as opposed to jus post bellum. 
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Moreover, the term, in remaining open as to the future, does not automatically equate 
resolution of the indeterminacy of current regulation of post-conflict dilemmas by 
international law with being ‘a good thing’. Finally, the term lex pacificatoria, in contrast to 
the term jus post bellum, signals openness to the possibility that the useful purpose of 
international legal regulation of peace settlements is to set out broad normative parameters 
that support negotiated outcomes involving local parties to conflict, rather than to dictate 
outcomes.  
 
For these reasons, I prefer the term lex pacificatoria as a way of capturing the current state of 
international law governing peace settlements and their implementation, not because it is 
important to have a battle over Latin terms, but because terms start to tell stories about the 
current state of play and the law’s future directions and ambitions. The lex pacificatoria 
acknowledges that international law may usefully be shaped by conflict resolution 
innovations, even as it attempts to shape settlement terms, and that it is important to 
understand the two-way nature of the interface. 
 
